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A SCOTTISH FIRST: HIP REPLACEMENT PRODUCT RULED 
NOT TO BE “DEFECTIVE” 
ELEANOR J. RUSSELL* 
 
The author discusses the recent decision in Hastings v Finsbury Orthopaedics 
Limited and Stryker UK Limited.1 Hastings is a landmark decision in that it is 
the first Scottish case in which a proof has been heard in an action arising 
under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 in respect of an alleged defect in a 
hip replacement product. 
 
Introduction 
The case of Donoghue v Stevenson2 is well known for its broad ratio, namely 
the neighbourhood principle which sets out the circumstances in which a duty 
of care will arise in respect of physical damage claims. The case, of course, 
has a narrower ratio in relation to the common law liability of a manufacturer 
in respect of injury or damage caused by defective products. Although the 
common law in relation to product liability “stands completely untouched,”3 it 
has been largely (but not completely) supplanted by the strict liability regime 
which is found in the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Case law in relation to 
that statutory regime is not particularly plentiful but the Court of Session has 
recently had occasion to consider the statutory provisions in Hastings v 
Finsbury Orthopaedics Limited and Stryker UK Limited,4 a case alleging 
defects in a hip replacement product. Although the English courts have 
witnessed litigation in respect of hip prosthesis systems, Hastings5 is the first 
such case in Scotland where a proof has been heard and it seems likely that 
the judgment of the court will be of interest to both manufacturers and 
consumers of such products. The publication of the judgment presents an 
opportunity to revisit the key statutory provisions and to examine a number of 
previous English decisions which have sought to interpret those provisions. 
An examination of the English cases, along with consideration of Hastings,6 
reveals certain points of disparity among the various judgments and it is 
suggested that further elucidation from the higher courts would be welcome. 
 
Background to the case 
The pursuer, a former forestry worker, had a history of arthritis affecting both 
hips. In March 2009, at the age of 54, he submitted to a left sided metal on 
metal (MoM) total hip replacement (THR). The prosthesis comprised a 
Mitch/Stryker Howmedica uncemented acetabular cup, manufactured by the 
first defender (Finsbury), and an Accolade V40 uncemented femoral stem with 
a large bearing MoM hip articulation, manufactured by the second defender 
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(Stryker). In November 2009, the pursuer underwent a right sided MoM total 
hip replacement, in which the same combination of components was used. In 
October 2012, the pursuer underwent revision of his left sided implant. He 
subsequently raised proceedings in which he sought damages against the two 
companies which manufactured the components used in his hip 
replacements, alleging that he sustained loss and damage as a result of the 
use of metal on metal total hip replacements in the operations performed in 
2009. His case did not proceed on the basis of fault or negligence (per 
Donoghue7), but rather under the relevant provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987. Accordingly, given the statutory basis of the pursuer’s 
case, it is appropriate to set out the genesis and key provisions of the relevant 
legislation.  
 
Genesis and key provisions of the 1987 Act  
Before considering the key provisions of the 1987 Act, it should be noted that 
in any common law action against a manufacturer, the pursuer must establish 
fault or negligence. If that cannot be done, and the onus in that respect lies on 
the pursuer, the action will fail. In Evans v Triplex Safety Glass Co. Ltd8 the 
plaintiff’s inability to establish fault against either of two defendants resulted in 
dismissal of his action. He had suffered injury when his car windscreen 
disintegrated but he was unable to establish whether it was the windscreen 
manufacturer or the manufacturer of the car (which had fitted the windscreen) 
who was at fault.  
The common law in relation to product liability was considered to be 
inadequate and has now been largely superseded by Part 1 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987.9 The Act resulted from Council Directive 85/374/EEC on 
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning liability for defective products [1985] OJ 
L210/29.10 The 1987 Act implements the UK's obligations under that 
Directive. Section 1(1) of the Act provides as follows: “[Part 1] shall have 
effect for the purpose of making such provision as is necessary in order to 
comply with the product liability Directive and shall be construed accordingly.” 
It follows that the1987 Act is to be interpreted so as to comply with the 
Directive. In A v National Blood Authority (No.1),11 a case involving blood 
products infected with Hepatitis C, it was accepted12 that, in the event of 
conflict, the wording of the Directive should be applied. More recently, in Gee 
v Depuy International Ltd13 Andrews J. stated: “It is well established that 
domestic legislation which brings into effect an EU directive must be 
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interpreted, so far as is possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of 
the directive, so as to achieve the result intended by the latter.”14  
 
The Act’s provisions have been described by the late Professor Joe Thomson 
as “hideously complex”.15 This article does not seek to explore the 
complexities of the legislation but offers instead a brief overview of its main 
provisions.16  
  
The key provision of the 1987 Act is s. 2(1) which imposes no-fault (or “strict”) 
liability on the producer of a product “where any damage is caused wholly or 
partly by a defect in a product”. Thus, “defectiveness, not fault, is the criterion 
of recovery.”17 The advantage offered to pursuers by the statutory scheme is 
immediately apparent. The pursuer is relieved of the need to prove fault.18 
Writing shortly before the legislation came into effect, Newdick made the 
following observations:  
“[L]iability for defective products is no longer to be dependent on fault, but 
rather on the mere fact of defectiveness.  
The broad reasons of policy for the change continue to be articulated by 
the injuries suffered by the thalidomide children. By the attention it 
devotes to consideration of the alleged fault of the defendant, the law of 
Negligence is unable to consider the interests of the person for whom the 
action has been brought.”19 
In a later article, the same author articulated the benefit of the new strict 
liability regime as follows: 
“The advantage of this approach for the individual is that liability turns on 
the existence of a defect alone...Strict product liability depends on the 
condition of the product, not the fault of its maker or supplier.”20 
While the Act heralds a move away from fault based liability, it does not confer 
on consumers a right to sue the producer as if there were a contractual 
warranty as to the safety standard to which the product had been designed.21 
 
A "product" is defined in s.1(2) of the 1987 Act as "any goods or electricity 
and… includes a product which is comprised in another product, whether by 
virtue of being a component part or raw material or otherwise.” “Damage” is 
defined in s.5(1) as "death or personal injury or any loss of or damage to any 
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property (including land)." Personal injury includes any disease and any other 
impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.22  
Section 2(5) provides that where two or more persons are liable for the same 
damage, their liability shall be joint and several. A number of possible 
defences are set out in s.4 of the Act and separate provision is made for the 
defence of contributory negligence in s.6(4). Accordingly, liability is not 
absolute in nature.23  
 
The statutory regime does not apply in all cases. Damage to the defective 
product itself is excluded from the scope of the Act by virtue of s.5(2).24 
Recovery is also excluded under the Act in respect of property damage claims 
which do not exceed £275 in value25 and in respect of damage to property 
which is not for "private use."26 There thus remains an important residual role 
for the common law, and in respect of any such action based on the common 
law, fault requires to be established. Indeed, s.2(6) of the 1987 Act provides 
that s.2 shall be without prejudice to any liability arising otherwise than by 
virtue of Part 1 of the Act.  
 
The central issue for the court in Hastings27 was whether or not a defect, as 
statutorily defined, existed in the prosthesis product in question. Section 3 of 
the Act defines the meaning of “defect”. In terms of s.3(1), a product is 
defective if its safety "is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect”. 
An "entitled expectation" test therefore applies. Although it has been judicially 
stated that the assessment is “conceptually simple” it has also been stated 
that “the assessment may be difficult in practice.”28 In Abouzaid v Mothercare 
(UK) Ltd29 the claimant suffered damage to his eye caused by a defect in a 
Coseytoes product. Pill L.J. articulated the test to be applied, stating that 
“[m]embers of the public were entitled to expect better from the appellants.”30 
In A v NBA,31 members of the public were held entitled to expect that blood 
transfused to them would be free from infection. In Gee,32 Andrews J. stated:  
“In order to prove the defect, a claimant must establish what it is about the 
state or behaviour of the product or the risks that it posed that led it to fall 
below the level of safety that persons generally were entitled to expect at the 
time the product entered the market, although he need not prove the precise 
mechanism by which it came to fall below that yardstick. The fact that a 
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product fails following normal use and in circumstances in which a standard 
product would not have failed may suffice for the Court to draw the inference 
that it is defective...Thus, for example, if an electrical appliance bursts into 
flames if it is left plugged in, or a fridge explodes, it plainly does not meet the 
standard of safety that persons generally are entitled to expect, and it is 
unnecessary for the claimant to establish what caused it to catch fire or 
explode.”33 
 
It should be noted that the test of defectiveness requires consideration of 
entitled, not actual expectation and it demands an objective, rather than a 
subjective, assessment. These points have been repeatedly emphasised by 
the courts. In A v NBA,34 Burton J. observed that “the Court decides what the 
public is entitled to expect… such objectively assessed… expectation may 
accord with actual expectation; but it may be more than the public actually 
expects, thus imposing a higher standard of safety, or it may be less than the 
public actually expects. Alternatively, the public may have 
no actual expectation – e.g., in relation to a new product"35 (emphasis in the 
original). In Wilkes v Depuy International Ltd 36 Hickinbottom J. stated:37 
“[T]he relevant level of safety is not that which a particular patient considers 
the product should provide; nor even the level of safety which members of the 
public generally may consider it ought to provide. The level of safety is not 
assessed by reference to actual expectations of an actual or even a notional 
individual or group of individuals. [The s.3(1) test] can only be a reference to 
an entitlement as a matter of law, not actual individual or even general 
expectation" (emphasis added). More recently, in Gee,38 Andrews J. stated 
that “[w]hat the public is entitled to expect may not match a person's actual 
expectation”39 (emphasis in the original). 
 
Section 3(2) of the Act provides as follows: 
“In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) above what persons 
generally are entitled to expect in relation to a product all the circumstances 
shall be taken into account, including— 
(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been 
marketed, its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and any 
instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from doing 
anything with or in relation to the product; 
(b) what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the 
product; and 
(c) the time when the product was supplied by its producer to another; 
 and nothing in this section shall require a defect to be inferred from the fact 
alone that the safety of a product which is supplied after that time is greater 
than the safety of the product in question.” 
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In Wilkes,40 Hickinbottom J. stated: 
“The circumstances which are relevant in a particular case is itself a matter of 
law; but it is to be noted that neither the Directive nor the Act imposes any 
restriction on the considerations that may be taken into account. The three 
specific matters set out in section 3(2) are circumstances which must be 
considered (“shall be taken into account”); but they are clearly not intended to 
be an exhaustive list of relevant circumstances, nor are they such that any 
other circumstance, to be relevant, must be shown to be eiusdem generis.”41 
The circumstances which may be relevant to the question of defectiveness 
are therefore not constrained by the Act. Cost, for example, may be a 
potentially relevant circumstance as illustrated in an example provided by 
Miller and Goldberg: 
“[N]o doubt it is the case that a car would be safer for its occupants if the 
strength of its shell were such that it would not buckle in a high speed crash 
and even safer if it were built with bullet-proof glass lest it should be driven 
through areas with a drug-fuelled gun culture. However, it would never be 
seriously suggested that an ordinary passenger car would be regarded as 
defective by virtue of the fact that it lacked such characteristics.”42 
As Nolan has observed, “[n]o product is perfectly safe, because safety must 
be traded off against cost and convenience.”43 
 
In Wilkes,44 Hickinbottom J. stated: “The Directive and Act set a standard of 
safety for virtually all products supplied to consumers…from an electric heater 
to a bottle top, from a car to a medicine. The standard of safety which people 
are entitled to expect across the whole range of these products is incapable of 
precise definition in a framework document such as the Directive; but, of 
course, more assistance and guidance could have been given than is found in 
that document…However, those responsible for the Directive clearly, and 
deliberately, declined to give better particulars. Indeed, in the report 
commissioned by the European Union in 2003 (J Meltzer, R Freeman & S 
Thomson, Product Liability in the European Union: A report for the European 
Commission (2003)), the possibility of defining “defect” to clarify controversial 
issues was mooted; but the authors of the report understood that this might 
fetter the ability of judges to deal with such matters on a case-by-case basis. 
The report envisaged that a body of case law would develop that would give 
guidance with regard to the concept. However, no such body of law has yet 
developed.”45 
 
Miller and Goldberg have said that “[i]t is arguable that the definition of a 
‘defect’ is the single most difficult part of the…Directive and Part 1 of the… 
Act46 while Professor Stapleton has observed that the definition of “defect” 
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used is at best circular, and at worst empty, because “what a person is 
entitled to expect is the very question a definition of defect should be 
answering.”47  
As noted above, it is the existence or otherwise of an alleged “defect” which 
would be the issue to confront the Court of Session in Hastings.48 The 
question of allegedly defective hip prostheses had already been ventilated, 
however, in a number of cases coming before the English courts. Those 
cases contain a number of significant judicial observations concerning the key 
concept of “defect”. It is accordingly appropriate to review those English 
authorities before turning attention to the Scottish case.  
 
English litigation 
Before Hastings49 came before the Court of Session, litigation concerning 
MoM THRs had taken place south of the border. In December 2016, judgment 
was handed down in Wilkes.50 The claimant in that case had received a MoM 
THR using components manufactured by the defendants which included a 
steel femoral shaft called a C-Stem. Three years later, the stem fractured and, 
during revision surgery, evidence was found of metal debris having been shed 
around the joint. The claimant alleged that there was a defect in the C stem 
component. Hickinbottom J. stated that a holistic and flexible approach should 
be adopted in assessing the safety which persons are generally entitled to 
expect. What circumstances are relevant and the weight to be attached to 
those circumstances would depend upon the particular facts of the case. 
Hickinbottom J. stated that “[t]he issue raised by the Act in terms of defect is 
necessarily one of open-textured judgment, untrammelled by any rigid rules 
outside the few that appear in the Act itself.”51 He concluded that the claimant 
had failed to satisfy the court that the C-Stem suffered from a defect as 
statutorily defined (i.e. that its safety was not such as persons generally were 
entitled to expect).52 Accordingly, the manufacturer was held not to be liable 
to the claimant under s.3 of the 1987 Act.  
Some months later, in May 2018, judgment was handed down in Gee.53 This 
case focussed on the Pinnacle Ultamet hip prosthesis system (a different 
system from that which would form the basis of the litigation in Hastings). The 
claimants’ contention in Gee was that the prostheses supplied to them were 
defective in terms of s.3 of the 1987 Act, and that this had caused personal 
injury for which the manufacturer was liable. In the course of her judgment, 
Andrews J. stated:54  
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“It is important to bear in mind that the test is not that of an absolute level of 
safety, nor is there an absolute liability for harm caused by a harmful 
characteristic. The Act does not impose a warranty of performance on a 
producer: Pollard v Tesco Stores Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 393 at [17]. All hip 
prostheses will eventually wear out and fail, if the patient survives long 
enough, and some will fail within 10 years: the natural propensity of a hip 
implant to fail therefore cannot be a "defect," any more than the inevitable 
wear and tear that causes minute particles of debris to enter the patient's 
body. Otherwise all hip implants would be "defective", irrespective of the 
materials used in the articulation.” 
Andrews J. held that the defendant was not liable to the claimants. Her 
judgment contains a detailed exposition of the nature and history of hip 
replacement surgery, and of certain pathological conditions observed in 
patients who received MoM prostheses. When, in Scotland, the Hastings55 
case arose, parties entered into a joint minute of agreement setting out the 
factual background to the questions at issue. That joint minute was based on 
the detailed exposition by Andrews J. in Gee.56 Attention is now turned to the 
Scottish case. 
 
Hastings-A Scottish First 
In Hastings,57 the pursuer’s case was based on s.2 of the 1987 Act, which, as 
has been noted, imposes no-fault liability for damage caused by a defect in a 
product. The pursuer contended that the metal on metal total hip 
replacements (MoM THR) used in his operations were defective, in terms of 
s.3 of the Act, because their safety was not such as persons generally were 
entitled to expect. It is worth noting that the product in question in Hastings58 
was of a medicinal character and it is useful to preface discussion of the case 
with observations made in precisely such a context by Gibson et al: 
“[T]he open-textured character of the prescribed safety standard provides the 
court with a very considerable degree of flexibility in relation to the matters to 
which it can properly have regard so as to enable it to perform its duty, on a 
case-by-case basis, of ensuring that the appropriate safety standard is set on 
as fully an informed basis as possible having regard to the facts pertaining to 
the specific product in question.”59 
 
Background to the case  
MoM THRs were developed in the late 1990s and became popular in the early 
2000s. At one stage during 2000-2010, MoM was the commonest bearing 
surface implanted, particularly in the young and active. It promised to be a low 
wearing bearing surface, with the added benefit of allowing hip resurfacing. 
The pursuer’s MoM THRs were Mitch/ Accolade products. The background to 
the genesis (and subsequent withdrawal) of the product can be outlined as 
follows. Stryker manufactured a range of femoral stem products but wanted to 
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enter the market for provision of MoM THRs. In 2005, it formed an agreement 
with Finsbury for the development, manufacture and supply of a metal 
acetabular cup and femoral head that would be compatible with its Accolade 
stems. The consequence was the production by Finsbury of the Mitch range 
of products which together with Stryker's Accolade stem, was brought to 
market. The Mitch/Accolade product became commercially available in the UK 
in 2006. It was supplied together with instructions for use. Those instructions 
contained a section entitled "Possible Adverse Effects" which provided 
information about corrosion of metal implants leading to metallic ion release 
and possible adverse reactions to metal particles. The instructions 
emphasised that the expected life of total hip replacement components was 
finite. Surgeons were advised to warn patients of all the Possible Relevant 
Adverse Effects. 
By the end of the 2000s, sales of MoM THRs generally had dramatically 
declined following expressions of concern among orthopaedic professionals 
about revision rates and possible difficulties in carrying out revision 
operations. Academic papers reported the incidence of pseudotumour in a 
group of female patients experiencing problems after MoM hip resurfacing60 
as well as the poor outcome of revision surgery owing to associated soft 
tissue destruction.61 Adverse reaction to metal debris (“ARMD”) was first 
reported at a national orthopaedic conference in 2008-2009 and awareness of 
it increased over subsequent years. In 2012, public concern regarding the 
safety of MoM implants increased following the broadcasting of the results of 
an investigation by the British Medical Journal and BBC Newsnight.  
Medical device alerts (“MDAs”) in relation to MoM hip replacements were 
issued by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(“MHRA”) in 2010 and in 2012. Annual follow-up of THR patients for the life of 
the implant was required. 
In April 2012, an "urgent" field safety notice ("FSN") was issued by Depuy 
(which had acquired Finsbury in 2009) and Stryker in relation to the 
Mitch/Accolade product owing to a higher than expected revision rate for the 
product. An instruction was given not to implant the product.  
A review article by Mellon et al62 stated: 
“whilst there is evidence that MoMHRA [metal-on metal hip resurfacing 
arthroplasty] works well in young active men, the failure rates of MoMHRA in 
women and of metal-on-metal THR in both sexes are significantly higher than 
expected…This high failure rate appears to be due to the pro-inflammatory 
effects of submicron wear particles…These failures typically involve soft 
tissue and bone disruption which can be massive, leading to severe functional 
impairment and extremely challenging revision surgery." 
From 2012, the implantation of MoM Total Hip Replacements ceased 
altogether although some MoM hip resurfacings continue to be performed.  
 
The preliminary proof 
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The case came to preliminary proof before Lord Tyre. The proof was 
restricted to the issue of whether certain propensities and risks inherent in 
MoM THR prostheses rendered the particular combination of components 
employed in the pursuer’s operations “defective” within the meaning of the 
1987 Act. Lord Tyre set out the question for determination as follows:63 
"Does the admitted inherent propensity of metal on metal hip prostheses to 
shed metal debris through wear in use …and the admitted risk that some 
patients may suffer an adverse reaction to such metal debris that may 
necessitate early revision, render the [Mitch/Accolade] product less safe than 
persons generally were entitled to expect and thus defective within the 
meaning of the 1987 Act, taking account of all of the circumstances." 
A central plank of the pursuer’s argument was the fact that surgeons had 
stopped recommending MoM THRs some three years after his operations, 
following concern about the survival time until revision (compared to 
alternative products using different materials) and a “higher risk” of an 
unsuccessful revision. 
Parties were agreed that the question of whether there was a defect in a 
product fell to be determined as at the date of its supply. In this case, the 
prostheses were supplied in 2009, when the pursuer received the implants. 
Parties disagreed, however, as to the principal purpose/s of the 1987 Act. 
While the pursuer submitted that its principal objective was consumer 
protection, the defenders submitted that the Directive had a variety of 
purposes, of which consumer protection was only one. In Lord Tyre’s opinion, 
there was no justification for construing the Directive or the Act in a manner 
more favourable to the consumer than to the producer. The Advocate General 
(Szpunar) in Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH v S64 had observed that the rights 
and obligations arising from the Directive resulted from a balancing of different 
interests, which “include guaranteeing that competition will not be distorted, 
facilitating trade within the common market, consumer protection and 
ensuring the sound administration of justice.”65 Lord Tyre accordingly took the 
view that while the effective protection of consumers was a key objective of 
the Directive, it was not the main or overriding one. It had equal status with 
the other objectives. His Lordship continued:66 “[T]he European case law is 
quite clear that when approaching the task of interpreting the Act, the court is 
not entitled to give [the protection of consumers] priority over the [other 
objectives of the Directive].” 
Under reference to Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-
Anhalt — Die Gesundheitskasse67 (which concerned defects in pacemakers), 
Lord Tyre observed that the question of defectiveness “must …be approached 
on the basis of the reasonable expectations of the public at large, taking into 
account inter alia the intended purpose, the objective characteristics and 
properties of the product, and the specific requirements of the group of users 
for whom the product was intended.” 
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Lord Tyre then alighted upon an examination of the English case law. In A v 
NBA68, persons infected with Hepatitis C through blood transfusions sought 
damages under the 1987 Act against the authorities responsible for 
production of blood and blood products. Burton J. held that products could be 
categorised either as "standard" or "non-standard". Standard products are 
and perform as the producer intends. Non-standard products are different 
from the standard product because they are deficient or inferior in terms of 
safety, and it is the harmful characteristic present in the non-standard product 
which has caused the damage. The product in A v NBA69 was non-standard. 
As regards standard products, Burton J. proposed the following approach:70 
"If a standard product is unsafe, it is likely to be so as a result of alleged error 
in design, or at any rate as a result of an allegedly flawed system. The harmful 
characteristic must be identified, if necessary with the assistance of 
experts. The question of presentation/time/circumstances of supply/social 
acceptability etc will arise...The sole question will be safety for the foreseeable 
use. If there are any comparable products on the market, then it will obviously 
be relevant to compare the offending product with those other products, so as 
to identify, compare and contrast the relevant features." 
Burton J. also held that "avoidability" was not one of the circumstances to be 
taken into account under s.3 of the Act.71 Furthermore, the test was not that of 
an absolute level of safety. The requisite level of safety was not what is 
actually expected by the public at large, but rather what they are entitled to 
expect.  
Lord Tyre then examined Wilkes72 in which Hickinbottom J. had stated certain 
“uncontroversial”73 propositions: the Directive and the Act focus not on the 
acts or omissions of producers, but upon the condition of the product; the 
condition required of the product is not put in terms of fitness for purpose but 
in terms of safety, the hallmark of defect being a lack of safety; safety is a 
relative concept- there cannot be a sensible expectation that a medical or 
medicinal product is entirely risk-free and potential benefits have to be 
balanced against risks; the test for safety requires an objective approach by 
reference to what persons generally are entitled to expect as a matter of law. 
It followed that in considering whether a product was defective, the court 
required to “assess the appropriate level of safety, exercising its judgment, 
and taking into account the information and the circumstances before it”.74 
Although a causal link must be proved between the defect and damage, 
claimants are not required to prove the cause of that lack of safety or why the 
product failed. 
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On the issue of "avoidability", Hickinbottom J. had stated that "the ease and 
extent to which a risk can be eliminated or mitigated may be a circumstance 
that bears upon the issue of the level of safety that the public generally is 
entitled to expect".75 Lord Tyre agreed. 
Although Hickinbottom J. had considered the standard/non-standard 
classification (adopted by Burton J. in A v NBA76) to be “unnecessary and 
undesirable”,77 Lord Tyre thought it was almost inevitable that, when 
identifying whether or not a product was “defective”, there would be some 
focus on whether or not the particular product was or was not within the 
producer's design specification.78  
Hickinbottom J. had considered that regulatory approval was not an automatic 
defence under the Act, but might be evidence that the level of safety of the 
product was that which persons generally were entitled to expect.79 As far as 
warnings and other information for use were concerned, these would usually 
be addressed to a learned intermediary in the case of medicinal products. 
While the existence of such an intermediary did not provide an automatic 
defence, it was “unarguable that the fact that there is a learned intermediary 
(who has chosen a particular prosthesis for a particular patient and has 
available, not only his general professional knowledge, but also the specific 
IFU including warnings) is other than a relevant circumstance for the purposes 
of section 3 of the Act."80 
The third of the English cases which Lord Tyre examined was Gee.81 Lord 
Tyre agreed with the assessment of Andrews J. in that case that the Directive 
and the Act required a flexible approach to the question of what might 
constitute relevant circumstances. Those circumstances might differ, 
depending on the product and the nature of the complaint about it. Lord Tyre 
agreed that consideration of benefits of a medical or pharmaceutical product 
need not necessarily be confined to safety benefits. Whether it was 
appropriate to weigh the benefits of a new product against known risks would 
depend upon the circumstances of a particular case. 
 
Application of the legal principles to Hastings 
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The court in Hastings82 was required to establish firstly, the "entitled 
expectation" of persons generally in respect of the safety of the 
Mitch/Accolade product and secondly, whether the product failed to meet that 
entitled expectation. Lord Tyre emphasised that the question for determination 
was expressly restricted to the Mitch/Accolade product before adding: “It will 
then be for others to assess the significance of my opinion in relation to other 
MoM THR products which are the subject of litigation in this jurisdiction.”83 
 
What was the entitled expectation of persons generally in respect of the 
Mitch/Accolade product? 
As far as entitled expectation was concerned, Lord Tyre stressed that "safety" 
was a legal concept and not a medical term of art. It was for the court, rather 
than for orthopaedic surgeons, to decide what, as a matter of law, was the 
entitled expectation in relation to the "safety" of the Mitch/Accolade product. 
Some of the experts had identified one of the potential benefits of a MoM 
implant as improved survivorship. There was, however, no ten-year outcome 
data in respect of the MoM THRs supplied during the relevant period. That did 
not lower the entitled expectation in relation to MoM implants below that of 
other products with the requisite period of outcome data to support their use. 
The lack of such data suggested however that the court  (following the 
objective assessment required by the Act) could not conclude that there was 
an entitled expectation in 2009 that MoM implants generally or the 
Mitch/Accolade product in particular would have a 
significantly improved survivorship as compared with MoCP (metal on 
conventional polyethylene) implants then in common use. That may have 
been the hope (or belief) of some orthopaedic professionals, but it did not 
represent the statutory test against which the existence or otherwise of a 
defect in the product must be measured. 
Although the parties offered ostensibly differing formulations of entitled 
expectation, Lord Tyre, on closer examination of their respective positions, 
took the view that their positions could be reconciled as follows:  
“[T]he entitled expectation in relation to the Mitch/Accolade product can …be 
stated as being that, subject to de minimis considerations, its level of safety 
would not be worse, when measured by appropriate criteria, than existing 
non-MoM products that would otherwise have been used.”84  
Lord Tyre stated that the instructions for use (“IFU”) would have had no 
significant effect on entitled expectation in relation to the Mitch/Accolade 
product. His Lordship doubted whether they had (or were expected to have) 
any real practical value. They were in very small point size so as to be 
virtually illegible and the instructions in relation to possible adverse effects 
were in highly general and heavily qualified terms. Evidence indicated that 
orthopaedic surgeons would not generally read IFU in detail and Lord Tyre 
concluded that IFU would have added little, if anything, to the knowledge of 
any surgeon qualified to carry out a hip replacement operation.  
 
Did the product fail to meet entitled expectation? 
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Lord Tyre’s starting point in relation to this issue was a joint statement from 
the parties’ experts in orthopaedic surgery to the effect that the majority of 
patients with MoM implants are pain free and able to enjoy daily activities with 
excellent outcome and that the pain relief and functional improvement 
achieved with MoM and comparable products are similar.  
The pursuer's argument was founded strongly upon the fact that, following 
orthopaedic concerns and MDAs, surgeons had stopped recommending MoM 
THRs and they had been withdrawn from the market. By 2012 there had 
emerged a consensus that failure rates (in terms of survivorship) of MoM 
THRs were higher than had been expected and compared unfavourably with 
other types of THR. Members of various disciplines sought an explanation of 
those failure rates but no consensus emerged. Many of the published articles 
concluded that further research was necessary.  
His Lordship stated: 
“I accept that expression of serious professional concerns, followed by the 
issuing of an official alert and the withdrawal from the market of an entire 
range of products constitutes powerful prima facie evidence that those 
products were not performing in accordance with expectation. But that is not 
necessarily the same as not performing in accordance 
with entitled expectation, and in assessing whether the latter has been 
established, I am able to proceed with the benefit of hindsight, and to have 
regard to material that is now available but was not available in 2012 when 
MoM THRs ceased to be used.”85 
Having reviewed the expert evidence, Lord Tyre concluded:86 
“[T]he pursuer has established…that there may be a causal link between the 
creation of metal debris from a MoM THR and periprosthetic damage, but only 
in a minority of cases and in limited circumstances including high levels of 
exposure, and not necessarily for reasons peculiar to MoM THRs. That does 
not, in my opinion, of itself constitute a failure to meet entitled expectation.” 
Lord Tyre proceeded to address the question of whether there is a causal link 
between MoM THR design and the creation of metal debris that is capable of 
causing periprosthetic damage. Having considered the biomechanical 
evidence, he concluded:87 
“[T]he pursuer…has demonstrated a mechanism by which metal debris is 
capable of being produced in large head MoM THRs in a manner which would 
not occur either in THRs using smaller head sizes or in MoM resurfacings. 
That said, I am not satisfied that all of the necessary links in the chain 
between such a mechanism and adverse health effects have been 
established...In particular, I do not consider that there is any evidence that 
would entitle me to find that debris from the head/stem interface is, or is even 
potentially, more damaging than debris from the bearing surface…The 
proportion of debris produced at the head/stem interface appears…to be 
small in comparison with that produced at the bearing surface. More 
significantly, it was not in dispute that the combination of a titanium alloy 
Accolade stem and a CoCr metal femoral head (whether a Mitch component 
or otherwise) has been used in many other implants including MoP THRs, and 
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no evidence was led of metal debris with especially damaging characteristics 
having been produced by such combinations.”  
The practical criteria adopted by Lord Tyre in assessing whether there was a 
failure to meet entitled expectation in relation to the Mitch/Accolade product 
were (i) time to revision, i.e. survivorship, and (ii) the existence or otherwise of 
higher risk of unsuccessful revision. Lord Tyre pointed out that his finding 
must be based upon evidence relating to the Mitch/Accolade product but 
because of the short period during which it was on the market, such evidence 
was not in abundant supply.  
Dealing first with the issue of survivorship, Lord Tyre stated:88  
“So far as they go…the data from 2012 which informed the observations in 
the MHRA alert and the (latest available) data from 2018 are consistent with 
one another in showing, prima facie, a revision rate for MoM THRs 
significantly worse than rates for available alternatives.” 
Objections had however been raised in an expert report to the use of registry 
data to measure current or predict future survivorship. Among those 
objections was the effect on the figures of “outliers”, i.e. surgeons whose 
revision rates differed significantly from the normal range. Lord Tyre observed 
that once account was taken of outlier surgeons, it could not be concluded 
that the Mitch/ Accolade product had a materially lower survivorship than 
other available products or national standards. Furthermore, other factors 
rendered it unsafe to conclude from the bare data that the revision rate of the 
device fell below the entitled expectation of those who received it. The 
Mitch/Accolade product was implanted largely in young and/or active patients 
for whom large head MoM THRs were designed, and they were 
predominantly male. That is likely to have lowered the average survivorship of 
Mitch/Accolade implants, for reasons unconnected with the product itself. 
Revision rates for the Mitch/Accolade product were also likely to have been 
affected by the publicity surrounding MoM THRs generally. Expert testimony 
acknowledged that there was a lowering of the threshold for revision surgery 
owing to clinicians' fears of complications. The MDAs recommended annual 
follow-up for the life of the implant, and the possibility of revision surgery in 
asymptomatic patients. Lord Tyre accepted that it was likely that these factors 
would have increased the revision rate in relation to the Mitch/Accolade 
product for reasons other than the performance of the product itself. 
Accordingly, the registry data should not be treated as a reliable indicator of 
the "success" of the product. 
Lord Tyre then addressed the second criterion in relation to entitled 
expectation namely the prospect of success of revision surgery for those 
patients whose initial implant fails and requires replacement. Studies in the 
late 2000s indicated that because of soft tissue damage caused by metal 
debris generated by MoM implants, the prospects of a successful revision 
operation were significantly reduced. Lord Tyre re-emphasised that the action 
related to a particular device. No evidence had been presented in relation to 
revision surgery where a Mitch/Accolade device had been used initially, other 
than evidence from the pursuer’s surgeon relating to the pursuer himself. That 
evidence did not include anything about soft tissue damage having rendered 
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the revision surgery more challenging or the eventual outcome less 
satisfactory than would otherwise have been the case. 
Evidence adduced from the defenders’ expert, Professor Pandit, cast doubt 
on the concerns expressed in the 2000s. His opinion was that more recent 
studies suggested that revisions for ARMD were successful, and that the risk 
of re-revision was significantly less than in cases where revision was 
performed due to other reasons for failure of the primary implant.  
Lord Tyre stated:89 “It does…appear to be the case that concerns about the 
potential difficulties of revision surgery for ARMD have not…materialised. I 
place considerable weight on the opinion of Professor Pandit in this 
regard…Having participated in some of the research which first raised 
concerns about large-head MoM THRs, he has continued to contribute to the 
leading edge of such thinking, and now recognises that some of those 
concerns, expressed on the basis of a small number of years' experience of 
MoM implants, are not supported by evidence based upon a longer period of 
experience.”  
 
His Lordship stated:90 
“In my opinion…the pursuer has not proved, on balance of probabilities, at the 
time when his prostheses were supplied, either (a) that survivorship was 
worse for the Mitch/Accolade product than for existing alternative products 
that could have been implanted instead; or(b) that use of the Mitch/Accolade 
product gave rise to an increased risk that revision surgery, in the event of its 
failure, would be unlikely to achieve as satisfactory an outcome as if the 
primary implant had been one of the existing alternatives.” 
 
Lord Tyre concluded that the pursuer had failed to prove that the entitled 
expectation in relation to the Mitch/Accolade product at the time of its supply 
had not been met. Accordingly, the pursuer had not proved that there was a 
“defect” in the product so as to give rise to liability on the part of the defenders 
under the 1987 Act. However, in an important caveat, his Lordship added:91 
“In holding that the pursuer in the present action has failed to prove that the 
Mitch/Accolade product supplied to him was defective, I do not exclude the 
possibility that another pursuer might be able to present evidence in relation 
to a different product sufficient to establish, on balance of probabilities, that 
entitled expectation in relation to that product had not been met."  
Lord Tyre concluded: “I wish simply to make the point that my opinion should 
not be read as a finding that it has been positively proved that the safety of 
large-head MoM THRs as a class was such as persons generally were 
entitled to expect at the time when they were supplied.”92 
 
Discussion 
The law on product liability was radically transformed by Part 1 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987. Although the Act’s strict liability regime has 
now been in place for over three decades, there have been relatively few 
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decisions in which the Act’s provisions have been applied. For that reason 
alone, the decision in Hastings93 is most welcome, providing, as it does, 
further important guidance as to the term “defect”, the existence of which is, of 
course, key to liability under the statutory scheme. As Nolan has observed, 
“the test of defectiveness in s.3 is essentially an empty vessel to be filled by 
judicial analysis.”94 Hastings, albeit a first instance decision, is certainly a 
welcome addition to the contents of that vessel. 
Until recently, the most detailed examination of the key concept of “defect” 
was found in the judgment of Burton J. in A v NBA.95 The English decisions in 
Wilkes96 and Gee97 some years later provided further elucidation. As has 
been seen, the pursuer's argument in Hastings98 that the prosthesis was 
defective was comprehensively rejected. That had, of course, also been the 
outcome in Wilkes99 and Gee.100 While much of what is said in Wilkes101 and 
Gee102 is endorsed in Hastings,103 there are also some elements of disparity 
among the judgments which are worthy of comment. 
 
As far as common ground is concerned, Lord Tyre agreed with Hickinbottom 
J. in Wilkes104 that an objective assessment must be adopted in relation to the 
issue of safety and with Andrews J. in Gee105 that the Directive and the Act 
required a flexible approach to the question of what might constitute relevant 
circumstances in the “defectiveness” assessment. Hickinbottom J. had made 
clear in Wilkes106 that the standard of safety which persons generally are 
entitled to expect is “a matter of law”107 to be assessed on a case by case 
basis. The circumstances which are relevant to that assessment in a 
particular case are likewise a matter of law.108 It is accordingly a matter for the 
courts to determine the standard of safety which persons generally are 
entitled to expect. Lord Tyre reiterated this point in Hastings,109 emphasising 
that a legal, not a medical, assessment of expected expectation was required. 
It was therefore for the court, not orthopaedic surgeons, to determine the 
entitled expectation in relation to the Mitch/ Accolade product.  
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In Wilkes,110 Hickinbottom J. took the view that avoidability may be a 
circumstance which bears upon the level of safety which the public is 
generally entitled to expect. In Hastings,111 Lord Tyre expressed his 
agreement with that view. It is noteworthy that their approach differs from that 
adopted by Burton J. in A v NBA.112 Burton J. took the view that avoidability 
was not a relevant circumstance in relation to the entitled expectation enquiry, 
as the purpose of the legislation was to exclude consideration of fault. If one 
did not exclude avoidability from the exercise, the Directive, in Burton J.’s 
view, “would not only be toothless but pointless.”113 A v NBA,114 however, 
concerned a non-standard product, namely blood infected with Hepatitis C. 
Hastings115 and Wilkes,116 on the other hand, involved standard products. 
Nolan has observed: “To argue …that avoidability is not relevant in such a 
case is …at least as misconceived as to argue that avoidability is relevant in a 
non-standard product case, the flaw in both arguments being the failure to 
recognise the significance for this question of the standard/non-standard 
product distinction.”117 
Further judicial analysis of this issue would certainly be welcome. 
 
While much of what is said in the earlier cases is affirmed in Hastings,118 
there are certain elements of disparity among the judgments. Section 3(2) of 
the Act provides that, in determining “defectiveness,” all the circumstances 
shall be taken into account, including “the time when the product was supplied 
by its producer to another”. Interestingly, in Wilkes,119 Hickinbottom J. stated 
that “[t]he Act…requires consideration of whether, at the time the producer 
first put the product into circulation, that product did or did not have the level 
of safety that persons generally are entitled to expect”120 (emphasis added). 
In Gee,121 Andrews J. took the same view, namely that the time at which 
defectiveness was to be judged was the time at which the product entered the 
market.122 Lord Tyre took a different view in Hastings,123 preferring the date 
on which the product was supplied to (i.e. implanted into) the pursuer. That 
had been the agreed position between the parties in Hastings.124 Lord Tyre 
was however alert to the fact that the trial in Gee125 proceeded on the basis 
that it was common ground that entitled expectation was to be evaluated at 
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the time the product was first put on the market by the producer. Lord Tyre 
was informed that Gee126 proceeded on that basis because nothing turned on 
whether the time of supply was taken to be the date when the product was 
first put on the market (2002) or the later date of the supply of the prostheses 
to the individual claimants. It can be anticipated that, in other cases, the date 
on which defectiveness is assessed might be a matter of some significance. 
This is therefore an issue which might usefully be explored and clarified in 
subsequent court judgments. 
 
It will be remembered that in A v NBA,127 Burton J. drew a distinction between 
standard and non-standard products, a distinction about which Hickinbottom 
J. in Wilkes128 expressed some misgivings, describing it as “unnecessary and 
undesirable.” Lord Tyre in Hastings129 did not share those misgivings and 
seemed content to resurrect the standard/non-standard classification, stating 
that it was inevitable that there would be some focus on whether or not a 
particular product was within or outwith the producer’s design specification. 
He pointed out130 that the prosthesis in Hastings131 was a standard product, 
there being no suggestion that it did not fall within the manufacturer’s 
specification. Again, further discussion of these classifications in future cases 
will be awaited. 
 
It is clear therefore that Hastings132 takes a similar approach to the earlier 
English cases in some respects but in other respects a different approach is 
taken. There is a paucity of case law in this area and some matters would 
certainly benefit from further judicial analysis. One of the most striking 
elements of the judgment in Hastings133 is of course its novelty as far as the 
courts in Scotland are concerned. In the opening paragraph of his opinion, 
Lord Tyre observed that Hastings134 was one of a number of actions raised in 
the Court of Session against manufacturers of metal on metal total hip 
replacement prostheses. It was, however, as his Lordship noted, the first one 
in which a proof has been heard in the Scottish courts. Lord Tyre himself 
observed: “Although the proof was concerned with a specific combination of 
acetabular and femoral components produced by particular manufacturers, it 
is envisaged that this opinion will be of relevance to actions concerning MoM 
THRs more generally.”135  
 
Another feature which stands out prominently in Hastings136 is the approach 
adopted by Lord Tyre to the instructions for use (“IFU”) supplied with the 
product. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Lord Tyre attached “little weight” to 
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the IFU supplied with the Mitch/ Accolade product in assessing the entitled 
expectation. (His reasoning is detailed above). Section 3(2) of the Act directs 
that in determining what persons generally are entitled to expect “all the 
circumstances shall be taken into account.” These circumstances include “any 
instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from doing 
anything with or in relation to the product.”   
In Wilkes,137 Hickinbottom J. stated: 
“Clearly, warnings given in relation to a product will qualify what the public 
generally are entitled to expect of a particular product, and thus go to the 
issue of whether that product is defective. That appears to be the unanimous 
conclusion of the authorities (see, eg Worsley v Tambrands Ltd [2000] PIQR 
P95, P104), and academic texts: see, eg Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 21st ed 
(2014), para 11-62, and Miller & Goldberg, para 12.65.”138 
Hickinbottom J. went on to state that where a product is available to a patient 
via a professional healthcare intermediary, the position is more complex. 
Indeed, in Wilkes,139 there was no interaction between the producer and the 
claimant. The producer had no obligation to provide the claimant with any 
information, because Parliament has determined that, in relation to such 
products, information about risks is best considered by the treating surgeon 
and relayed to the patient by the surgeon, who advises the patient as to 
intervention choices. In selecting a particular prosthesis, the surgeon will have 
available not only his or her professional knowledge but also the relevant IFU 
and warnings. While the interposing of a learned intermediary did not afford 
the producer an automatic defence, it was, in Hickinbottom J.’s view, a 
relevant circumstance. Nonetheless, when Hastings140 came before the Court 
of Session, Lord Tyre, having taken the IFU into account (as he was obliged 
to do in terms of s.3(2)(a) of the Act), proceeded to attach little weight to them. 
The weight to be attached to IFU is another issue which will no doubt be 
ventilated further in future case law. Until such time, the prudent course for 
manufacturers would be to heed the exhortation of Winfield and Jolowicz that, 
as far as warnings and instructions are concerned, “the manufacturer should 
err on the side of caution.”141 
 
Conclusion 
The decision in Hastings142 is a welcome contribution to product liability 
jurisprudence, providing, as it does, a detailed illustration of how the central 
concept of “defect” should be approached. Although it is the first Scottish 
judgment following a proof in relation to whether a hip replacement product 
was “defective” in terms of the 1987 Act, it is unlikely to be the last. While the 
pursuer was ultimately unsuccessful in his claim, it does not follow that future 
actions are destined to fail. Indeed, it is important to remember that the 
decision in Hastings143 relates specifically to the Mitch/ Accolade product and 
that Lord Tyre’s opinion contains an important caveat to the effect that 
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litigation concerning a different prosthesis may yield a different result. Other 
potential litigants who may have sustained injury following hip replacements of 
a different composition should not therefore be disheartened by the outcome 
in this particular case. Indeed, the door is left very firmly open to further 
claims. Developments in this area will therefore be awaited with interest and it 
is certainly to be hoped that some clarification of the issues raised in this 
article will be forthcoming. 
 
